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Abstract 
Governments are driven by a desire by to maintain their legitimacy, 
and so must take public perception into account in its decision making. We 
present four studies using the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy (Crandall & 
Beasley, 2001) to explain why public perception matters to the government. 
Following our hypotheses that the public is motivated to have a consistent 
view of countries, governments, and people that it sees as related, we present 
evidence in our first study that the public links its perceptions of foreign 
governments to their alliance with the United States. The second study shows 
that manipulating the perceived level of democracy in Iran can affectively 
change the perception of its alliance with the United States. Likewise 
manipulating Irans perceived level of alliance with the United States can 
affectively change the perceived level of democracy in Iran. As Irans 
democracy increases so does its alliance and vice versa. The next two studies 
show that these public perceptions are linked to government action. We 
provide evidence that the United States is motivated by public perception in 
its decisions to use military force against other nations and in its detention of 
combatants in the war on terror. The third study shows that when aggressing 
against other nations the United States uses covert actions at a greater rate 
against democracies than non-democracies. Likewise, the study shows that 
combatants from democracies apprehended in the war on terror are more 
likely to be subjected to extraordinary rendition than those apprehended from 
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non-democracies. Both these studies are used as evidence of the governments 
desire to hide actions that the public would perceive as illegitimate.  
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The ability of a government to act and have its actions supported and followed 
by its public is a result of that governments legitimacy. The ancients Greeks 
addressed the conditions in which governments could wield power and the 
consequences that followed (see Zelditch, 2001). Most political theorists recognize 
governmental power as coming from one of two sources: coercion or legitimacy.  
Coercion involves forcing ones will upon another through the use of superior 
strength. The difference in strength allows the stronger to shape the behaviors of the 
weaker. Coercion is usually associated with authoritarian states where, the 
government is able to enforce its policies upon the populace through the use of 
superior force. Governing through force has disadvantages: it is costly, has limited 
influence, and can lead to instability. Taking these disadvantages into account, it is in 
the best interest of authorities to convince the public of their legitimacy.  
Legitimacy of a government follows when the public believes that 
government actions and decisions ought to be followed, not through the use of 
government force, but because they are right and appropriate. By convincing the 
public of their legitimacy,  governments can increase compliance while decreasing 
the amount of resources necessary for such compliance. Legitimacy is so important to 
effective governance that scholars on the subject have even advanced the claim that, 
Every authority system tries to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy (Zelditch & 
Walker, 2003). 
 The question then becomes, how are some governments able to convince the 
public that their authority is legitimate? One way a government can build its 
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legitimacy is by allowing the public to be represented in the decision making process. 
In this way the public comes to perceive that they have some control over or voice in 
the outcomes of governance. The perceived participation in governing by the public 
leads to an increased adherence to the decisions of that government and a belief in its 
legitimacy; democratic forms of government obtain legitimacy in this way (Lipset, 
1959; Buchanan, 2002).  
Public participation in the governing process is not the only way in which 
governments can and have attempted to develop legitimacy. Legitimizing myths 
(Sidanius & Pratto 1999) are another way in which authorities and political 
institutions attempt to garner public support for their actions; the belief in divine 
right or the right of kings to rule based on Gods will is an example of such myths 
used to increase public support for a ruler. Still, an election is one of the best ways to 
increase legitimacy through the process of elections and some will even go as far as 
to hold fake elections in an attempt to legitimize their rule. For example, Saddam 
Hussein held an election as late as October, 2002, in which he garnered 100% of 
the vote (BBC News, 2002).  
 Governments are willing to go to extensive lengths to convince the public of 
their legitimacy, and they are also motivated to act in ways that will maintain that 
legitimacy. Democracies engender legitimacy by creating the perception of citizen 
participation (Lipset, 1959), but even in democracies it is not feasible to have citizens 
vote or be represented in every decision that the government makes. One way in 
which governments can maintain their legitimacy without holding votes for every 
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action is by convincing the public of the procedural fairness of justice behind their 
actions (Tyler, 1994). Individuals look for fairness in the decision making procedures 
of authorities, especially when they do not have a direction hand in those procedures, 
this fairness comes to be equated with the authoritys legitimacy. The public comes to 
see government actions as legitimate as long as they perceive the process leading to 
those actions to be fair. Even groups negatively affected by government action will 
continue to see those actions as legitimate if they perceive that the process was fair 
(Tyler, 1994). If judgments of fairness lead to legitimacy, the question becomes how 
perceived fairness comes about. Theories in social psychology concerning the 
formation of perceptions provide some answers.  
Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy 
The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy (Crandall & Beasley, 2001) provides an 
explanation on how the public comes to perceive and maintain the perception of a 
governments legitimacy. The theory is builds upon the social perception work of 
Fritz Heider and his theories on balance and attribution. Crandall and Beasley apply 
these ideas to legitimacy; showing that the legitimacy of governments and leaders has 
its foundation in the perceptual process. Their theory uses three main principles to 
illustrate how legitimacy is developed: 
Principle 1. Perception is motivated to create structural balance, clarity, and 
affective uniformity. 
Principle 2. Attributions of controllability create a perceptual unit 
relationship. 
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Principle 3. People should have outcomes consistent with their moral value 
Balance is a classic in social psychology and is summarized by Crandall and 
Beasley in their paper on political legitimacy: 
people prefer affective consistency among the various elements that are 
related to each other. People are motivated to have a coherent emotional 
representation of people and objects, and the simultaneous presence of 
conflicting positive and negative relations among elements is disconcerting 
and unwanted (Crandall and Beasley, 2001, pp. 78).  
In other words people are motivated to perceive elements that are related in a 
consistent manner and to have them acted upon in accordance to this perception. In 
this way, People and governments have a moral value that people can perceive; they 
see in a person, in a nation, or in an action a degree of good and bad that is equivalent 
to legitimacy(Crandall & Beasley, 2001, pp. 78). This theory can be applied to 
public perception of governments and their actions; citizens of a given country are 
motivated to have a positive view of their nation and its actions. When there is an 
inconsistency between the government and its actions the legitimacy of those two 
elements comes into question. 
The implications of this theory can also be used to understand public 
perception of foreign countries. United States citizens are motivated by balance to 
have a positive view of democracy because in democracies the act of voting creates a 
unit relationship between the public and the government. Balancing then leads 
individuals to view democracy as good or the right and legitimate form of 
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governance and to view other countries with democratic regimes as good and 
legitimate. Predictions based on balance hold that countries perceived to be allied 
with the United States will the viewed positively and this perception will lead them to 
be perceived as more democratic, another positive trait.  
When countries are perceived as allies, there is a motivation to view them and 
their political system as all positive or all negative. Thus, being an ally with the 
United States, a positive trait, is consistent with being more democratic, a positive 
trait. When no ally status is perceived there is no motivation toward balance. Balance, 
however, is a two way-street in which perception can be motivated from either end; 
people can know that a country is democratic and thus perceive it to be an ally of the 
United States or know that it is an ally of the United States and thus perceive it to be 
more democratic. These public perceptions of foreign countries dictate what sort of 
foreign policy actions will the perceived as legitimate. Following the third principle 
of the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy these countries should have outcomes that are 
consistent with their perceived moral value; the United States should not enact 
foreign policy detrimental to positive, good, democratic nations.  
Democratic Peace  
Democratic peace theory is based on the observation that democratic 
nations never or very rarely come into armed conflict with one another. Immanuel 
Kant, in Toward Perpetual Peace (1795), wrote that constitutional republics are the 
main condition for perpetual peace because a majority of people would never vote to 
go to war, unless in self-defense. Kants theory points to the idea that it is the mass 
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public that drives the phenomenon; support for war must come from the people. The 
first empirical work on the theory was not conducted until 1964 (Babst, 1964), which 
produced statistical support for the theory. The idea gained widespread attention with 
the work of Singer and Small (1976) in The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 
1816-1965, which found only marginal support for the hypothesis but spurred much 
research. Since then the theory has become one of most researched in the field of 
political science. Maoz and Russett (1993) define the phenomenon this way,  
(1) democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as non-
democracies; and (2) over the last two centuries, democracies have rarely 
clashed with one another in violent or potentially violent conflict and (by 
some reasonable criteria) have virtually never fought one another in a full-
scale international war. (pp 624) 
The theory has received much empirical support since the work of Singer and Small 
and is even considered by some in the field; as close as anything we have to an 
empirical law in international relations (Levy, 1989, pp. 270). Democratic peace is 
usually explained in political science or international relations in one of two separate 
ways: theories that focus on the structure of democratic institutions or ones that rely 
on the normative influence of democracy to encourage peaceful negotiations in 
international relations. 
Structural Explanations 
 Structural explanations for democratic peace hold that democratic nations by 
their nature are set up to contain a system of checks and balances. In democracies the 
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mobilization to war is a difficult task involving many steps (Hermann & Kegley, 
1995). Not only is it necessary to obtain the support of the nations leader, but the 
various other institutions of government must also brought together in support of war. 
In the United States this would have to include the both houses of congress, as they 
are the governing bodies with the right to declare war. These constraints make it more 
difficult for two democracies to end up in conflict because of the multitude of steps 
required for both states to decide upon war. States with authoritarian regimes, 
however, do not experience such constraining factors and can be mobilized for war in 
some circumstances on the decision of one individual. Hermann and Kegley (1995) 
explain the structural explanations this way: 
 Explanations centering around institutional constraints assume that 
democratic leaders have a need to enlist widespread support before engaging 
in large-scale violence which, in turn, slows down and reduces the likelihood 
of such decisions (pp. 514).  
Normative Explanations  
A second approach to explaining democratic peace used by political scientists 
relies on the normative influence of a nations political system. Adherents to the 
normative model of democratic peace argue that in democracies, a norm of peaceful 
political competition arises in which conflicts are settled through negotiation and 
compromise rather than the elimination of opponents (Weart 1998). This norm of 
peaceful resolution is then applied by democratic countries and their leaders to the 
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realm of international conduct. Maoz and Russett (1993) contend that the normative 
model is based on two assumptions:  
1. States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior that are 
developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and 
institutions. Democratic states develop a norm of cooperation and 
negotiation through institutional practices, while non-democracies do not 
develop such a norm.  
2. The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between 
democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than 
by the former (Maoz & Russett, 1993, pp 625). 
The implication for the second assumption is that when two democracies 
come into conflict the norm of peaceful resolution will hold, however when 
democracies come into non-democracies it is the norms of the non-democracies that 
will predominate the conflict resolution. Non-democracies instead are accustomed to 
competition and conflict in which the goal is the elimination of the opponent. If this 
norm indeed comes to dominate the conflict between to countries then there is a much 
greater probability of violent conflict.  
Theorists of democratic peace have argued whether this normative influence 
in democracies lies at the level of people or with the leaders of the country. Kegley 
and Hermann (1995) have pointed out that studies often have a hard time finding a 
direct correlation between public opinion and foreign policy choice and in the short 
run; leaders seem highly inattentive to public pressure. A decision to go war, 
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however, are not always made in the short run and indeed as the structural model 
argues, democracies are set up to avoid quick war-making decisions. It may be 
possible that mass opinion does influence the decisions of policy makers on whether 
or not to go to war, and social psychology may provide a theoretical basis for this. In 
this paper I use the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy, I argue that public opinion does 
matters in the decision making process leading to violent international conflict.   
The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacys explanation democratic peace is based 
on the simple ideological principle related to balance. Crandall and Beasley (2001) 
state the principle as bad people deserve bad treatment (and good people deserve 
good treatment)(pp.79). This simple balancing of moral affect and treatment or 
outcome is used everyday and as the authors point out are the underpinnings to ideas 
about justice and deservingness. People like to see anothers actions as consistent 
with their treatment; good behavior warrants good treatment and those who 
misbehave should be subject to punishment. The motivation toward structural balance 
and this moral principle provide the basis for understanding the mechanisms of 
democratic peace. Individuals in democratic countries view democracy as good and 
perceive that countries with democratic political systems as related. Seeking balance 
between two related entities these individuals come to perceive other democratic 
countries as good. Following the principles of deservingness, good countries are 
entitled to good treatment and thus should not be aggressed against. In this way 
balance produces the normative influence that constrains democracies from engaging 
in violent conflict with one another. The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy is a naïve 
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theory and speaks to perceptions of the public, who are constrained from holding a 
nuanced view of foreign policy and relations. Elites, on the other hand, are more able 
to hold a nuanced view of foreign relations and tolerate imbalance and dissonance. 
The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy does not apply directly to elite perceptions, 
with the exception that elites are aware of the mass opinion structure.  
 I report here four studies meant to illustrate balance in the publics perception 
and the governments enactment of foreign policy. The first two studies examine 
balance in the publics perception of foreign governments and the United States, 
while the second two studies show how public perception is motivating government 
action. To establish balance acting on public perception I will measure their 
perceptions of foreign governments and those governments relations to the United 
States. Next I will seek to establish the bidirectional relationship in perception 
produced by the motivation toward consistency; a manipulation of a countrys 
democracy will change its perceived alliance with the United States, and 
manipulating a countrys alliance will alter the countrys perceived level of 
democracy. The final two studies link the publics perceptions to government action 
and provide examples of United States foreign policy decisions motivated by public 
perception. 
Study 1: Perceptions of United Nations 
 The first study sought to establish the publics use of balance in forming their 
perceptions of foreign countries. Because democracy is seen as good and the USA 
is a democracy, then any nation that is in a significant relationship with the USA 
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should also be good. I hypothesize that allies of the USA will be perceived to be 
democracies, or that a countrys perceived level of democracy would be positively 
related to its perceived level of alliance with the United States. Causation in these 
perceptions will go in both directions, and so I predict a correlation between 
perceived alliance with the USA and perceived level of democracy among the nations 
of the world.  
Method 
   Participants.   Data were collected from 350 participants in an undergraduate 
general psychology course at the University of Kansas in the spring of 2007. 
Participants received extra credit toward their course grade for agreeing to participate. 
Only self-identifying U.S. citizens were included in the final sample. Participants 
were told they would be filling out a questionnaire regarding their perceptions of 
several different foreign countries within the United Nations.  
   Questionnaire.  Each participant received at random a one-page questionnaire 
consisting of five or six member nations within the United Nations grouped at 
random. Member nations were grouped by random assignment to produce 33 
different questionnaires. The questionnaires provided some brief innocuous 
information for each target nation these items included: Location, capital, population, 
language, gross domestic product, and main export commodities. Information for 
each category was obtained through use of the CIAs world fact book website; in all 
190 of the 192 member nations were rated. 1 
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 After having read the brief information concerning the target nation, 
participants were prompted to answer four questions assessing their perceptions of 
each target nation: How important is this country on the world stage, how similar is 
this country to the United States, how democratic is this country, and what level of 
relation does this country hold with the United States. Participants then completed 
two items examining their perceptions of the United States: The United States is the 
greatest nation in the world, and how democratic is the United States government? 
(see Appendix for sample questionnaire). The various response variables were then 
correlated with each other to see to what degree they were related. 
Results and Discussion  
Correlating the perceptions of democracy and alliance with the United States a 
positive relationship was found r=.23, p< .001 n=190 (see Figure 1). Because Iraq 
was a statistical outlier and because its relations with the USA were complex during 
the time of data collection, we removed it from analysis, resulting in a correlation of 
r=.26,  p<.001 n=189.  
Participants who viewed a nation as allied with the U.S. were also saw that 
nation as more democratic. The positive correlations support the hypothesis that as 
perceived levels of either democracy or alliance increases so does the other so as to 
maintain a balanced state. Along with the democracy and ally variables, the 
correlations between several other variables were examined. Correlations between a 
target nations perceived level of similarity and alliance with the United States r=.63, 
n=190 and target nations perceived importance and alliance with the United States 
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r=.24, n=190. There was also a correlation between a target nations perceived 
importance and similarity to the United States r=.69, n=190 (see Table 1). All these 
findings offer good support to the idea that individuals show consistency when 
forming their perceptions of foreign governments and global relationships.  
 In addition we examined the within country correlations to see if our 
observed effects were due to differences in nations and not just differences within 
participants. The mean and median correlations were found to be negligible r=-.02 
and r=-.03 respectively; suggesting that the perceptions were stemming from 
differences in nations differences within people.  
Taken together these findings express support for the idea that the public 
seeks consistency in its perceptions of foreign nations. Perceptions of democracy and 
alliance with the United States are significantly correlated and this is probably due to 
the motivation of people to seek consistency in elements they see as related. In this 
case the public sees democracy and the United States as good and so they desire to 
see our allies as also democratic. It is possible that these perceptions are actually just 
observations of reality and that the public is not using balance to form its perceptions 
of foreign countries but just reporting the observed reality. One way to attempt to 
measure the degree to which our findings are due reality would be to catalogue the 
actual level of alliance and democracy of foreign nations and then compare those 
correlations to the ones we obtained. We do not have a data set that measures the 
actual alliance between the United States and foreign countries so we instead 
attempted to support our contention in a second study. The second study manipulated 
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the participants perceptions in this way our manipulation could get away from reality 
and see if participants still displayed consistency in their perceptions.   
Studies 2A & 2B: Perceptions of Ally Status and Perceptions of Democracy 
 Study 2 seeks to manipulate perceptions of democracy and level of alliance to 
determine causality. Theories of balance hold causality should be bidirectional; 
manipulating democracy should cause a change in perceptions of alliance and 
manipulating alliance should cause a change in perceptions of democracy. To test 
both directions of causality, we split this study into two parts. In Study 2A 
Perceptions of Ally Status, we manipulated the level of democracy in Iran and 
hypothesized that increasing the level of democracy would cause the participants 
perceptions of the level of alliance between the United States and Iran to increase as 
well. In Study 2B Perceptions of Democracy we manipulated the level of alliance 
between the United States and Iran and hypothesized that increasing the level of 
alliance would cause an increase the participants perception of the level of 
democracy in Iran compared to when the nation is not viewed as the United States 
ally. 
Method  
   Participants.  Participants were randomly assigned to take part in one of two 
studies. The first perception of democracy by ally status Study 2A consisted of 49 
participants, 23 female and 26 male, with a mean age of 20 years. The second 
perceptions of ally status by democracy Study 2B consisted of 57 participants, 26 
female, 30 male, and 1 not reporting gender, with a mean age of 21 years. Participants 
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for both samples were recruited from a general psychology course and received 
partial course credit for participating in the study. Participants in both sections were 
told they would be filling out a questionnaire about American society and foreign 
relations and that the survey would take no more than ten minutes of their time. 
   Questionnaire. The study was broken into two distinct parts which both sought to 
examine the relationship between a target nations perceived alliance with the United 
States and its perceived level of democracy. The first portion of the questionnaire 
remained the same across the two sections. Participants first filled out some brief 
demographic questions concerning their gender, citizenship status, and age. Four 
participants who were not U.S. citizens were excluded from study 2A, but none from 
study 2B. 
 Immediately following the demographic questions participants were asked to 
answer four questions meant to assess their degree of previous knowledge in the 
subject area. The study manipulated knowledge of Iran so all three questions dealt 
with information regarding that country. Two questions were fill-in-the-blank format 
asking The language spoken in Iran is and The Islamic Republic of Iran was 
formed in what year? The third and fourth questions were both multiple choice. The 
third asked, The word mullah is best translated as with the optional answers; a 
leader, dictator, priest, or general. Priest was the options scored as correct  The fourth 
questions asked, Which of the following countries does NOT share a border with 
Iran and  the multiple choice options; Afghanistan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, or 
Turkey. The correct answer was Kazakhstan. Any participant who correctly answered 
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all four questions was excluded from our final sample to avoid a failure of the 
manipulation based on prior knowledge in the area. No participants were excluded 
from study 2A for this reason; however, three participants were excluded from study 
2B. Having completed the previous knowledge items, all participants were then 
presented with the manipulation item, a vignette titled History of Iran.  
   Study 2A vignette. Participants receiving this form of the study were randomly 
assigned to read a vignette containing one of two supposed histories of Iran. The 
vignettes were broken up into two conditions; Democracy during the 70s 
condition, or Democracy during the 80s. The democracy during the 70s condition 
read that during the 1970s the country of Iran saw a flourishing of democracy, but a 
downward trend toward tyrant-driven theocracy during the 1980s. In the 
Democracy during the 80s condition, they were told that a theocracy existed 
during the 70s,  and democracy began to flourish in the 80s. The two forms were 
designed for counterbalancing, but they also allowed the results to be compared to 
Irans actual history.  
   Study 2B vignette. Participants in this section again read a vignette very similar to 
the materials for Study 2A, but instead of describing democracy in Iran, the vignettes 
described their status as a US ally (or not). Iran was described as either a US ally 
during the 70s, or as a US ally during the 80s. In this section they either read the 
70s condition with a history that stated Iran and the United States saw an increase in 
friendly relations during the 1970s only to have those relations sour dramatically 
during the 1980s, or the ally during the 80s condition where Iran and the United 
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States experienced starkly sour relations with each other during the 70s but saw 
marked improvement in those relations during the 80s. Again, the counterbalancing 
allowed for a comparison between the responses to the historically correct 
information and the incorrect vignette. Participants were then informed that a lot of 
time has elapsed since the 1980s and that the country is going through many political 
changes but still remains an important nation on the world stage.  
After reading a vignette, participants received the final questionnaire to 
complete. The heading of each section of questions reminded participants as to which 
condition they were in and prompted the questions to follow. The headings for study 
2A democracy during the 80s condition read, Please answer the following questions 
about Iran during the 1970s, when the country was presided over by an unelected 
mullah. A second section directly under the first prompted participants to answer 
questions about Iran in the 80s when it was a democracy. The reverse was used in 
the democracy during the 70s condition and the same headings were used for the two 
conditions study 2B only participants were reminded of whether Iran was an ally as 
opposed to democracy. Each section then contained seven questions meant to assess 
participants perceptions of either Irans level of alliance with the U.S. or democracy 
during the two separate time spans: How much of an ally was Iran to the United 
States, how similar is the Iranian government to the US government, how well does 
the head to the Iranian government represent the majority of the Iranian people, how 
responsive is the head of the Iranian government to the will and goals of Iranian 
people, from what I can tell, the Iranian people seem moral, good, and trustworthy, 
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how corrupt do you think the government of Iran is, and does Iran sound like a place 
that you might like to live (see Appendices for questionnaires). All participants were 
then debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Results and Discussion 
The Study 2A "Perceptions of Ally Status" led participants to view Iran as 
democratic in the 1970s and theocratic during the 80s in democracy during the 70s 
condition, while the democracy during the 80s condition reversed the order with 
participants viewing Iran as theocratic in the 70s with a shift to democracy in the 
80s. Participants perception of the level of alliance between Iran and the United 
States was then measured from the participants answer to the 1-4 Likert type 
question on perceived alliance; how much of an ally was Iran to the United States, a 
major ally, a partial ally, a very limited ally, or no ally at all, with a major ally being 
scored 4.  
When participants were led to believe that Iran was democracy in the 70s and 
theocracy in the 80s they perceived the level of alliance to change accordingly M= 
3.03 in the 70s and M=2.45 in the 80s. Likewise in the democracy during the 80s 
condition where participants saw Iran as a theocracy in the 70s and democracy in the 
80s they again perceived  the level of alliance change to be consistent with level of 
democracy, M=2.37 during the 70s and M=3.15 in the 80s. The resulting interaction 
was significant F(1,56)=20.75, p<.001 (see Figure 2) and supports the hypothesis that 
viewing Iran as democratic leads participants to also view it as more allied with the 
United States.  
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Study 2B "Perceptions of Democracy" manipulated participants view of Iran 
as either and ally of the United States or its adversary. This time the outcome of 
interest was perceived level of democracy in Iran and this variable was measured by 
creating a democracy scale from the answers the questionnaire items: How 
democratic is the Iranian government?, How similar is the Iranian government to 
the US government?, How well does the head of the Iranian government represent 
the majority of the Iranian people?, and How responsive is the head of the Iranian 
government to the will and goals of the Iranian people? The four items in the scale 
hung together well α=.84 in both conditions. In the ally during the 70s condition, 
participants were informed that the United States and Iran were allies in the 70s but 
not in the 80s. In this condition participants perceived the level of democracy in Iran 
to change in order to be consistent with its level of alliance, M=4.67 in the 70s and 
M=4.08 in the 80s. When the level alliance was reversed and Iran was said to be the 
United States adversary in the 70s and its ally in the 80s the participants perceptions 
of Irans democracy also changed, M=3.85 in the 70s and M=4.70 in the 80s. Again 
a significant interaction was observed F(1,47)=10.45, p<.01 (see Figure 3), 
supporting the hypothesis that perceiving a country as allied with the United States 
will cause participants to view that country as more democratic.  
Both of these results provide evidence in support of the idea that balance is a 
powerful motivating factor in individuals foreign policy perceptions and decision 
making. Individuals desire balance in the relations they see in the world and this 
includes politics. Americans seek to understand the world in a way that allows them 
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to continue to have a positive view of themselves and their country and balance is the 
mechanism through which they hold on to that view. Many Americans do not hold a 
nuanced view of world politics and balance provides an easy cognitive solution for 
perceiving foreign countries which allows people to hold on to their own positive 
view of themselves and their country; if a country is Americas ally, it must also be 
democratic like America and likewise if a country is democratic like America, it is 
most likely going to be its ally. For a majority of the public, balance enables an 
understanding the world politics with greater speed and ease. They do not have to 
waste cognitive resources on matters of which they do not have much knowledge. 
Elites, however, need not rely on simple balance to guide their perceptions of politics; 
having a more nuanced and knowledgeable view of world politics they are able hold 
views that are not in a state of balance. While able to hold a more nuanced view of 
world politics, these elites must still grapple with public perceptions, and the elites 
awareness of mass opinion guides their actions. 
Study 3: Democracies and Covert Action 
 Studies 1 and 2 provided evidence that the desire for balance is determining 
the publics perceptions of foreign countries. Study 3 seeks to provide evidence that 
government authorities take these public perceptions into account when making 
foreign policy decisions. To do that, I looked at governmental actions that make the 
best sense if understood as being guided by concerns about public opinion.  
 Democratic peace theory provides evidence of that government does take 
public perception into account when making decision about which countries to 
  
25
 
aggress against. In case of democratic peace, however, competing theories exist in 
political science which claims to explain the phenomenons existence. What the 
competing theories cannot account for is that democracies do aggress against one 
another in covert interventions. The Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy, on the other 
hand, predicts that the government is constrained by public perceptions from overtly 
aggressing against democracies, so to the extent that democracies desire to aggress 
against other democracies they will do so covertly. Following the theory, United 
States citizens view democracy as good, people in democracies are in unit 
relationship with their governments, so people in democracies are good. Finally war 
is bad, so war against democracies is inconsistent previous statements and thus 
illegitimate. To study this we need to examine the incidence of overt and covert 
actions by the United States to determine if there is a difference in the level of 
democracy of the nations target by those actions. Our hypothesis is that: The United 
States engages in overt militarized international disputes or international war at a 
significantly greater rate against non-democracies than against democracies and when 
the United States uses force against democracies, it will use covert force at greater 
rate than against non-democracies. 
Method 
   Participants. This study used an archival data analysis method where events of 
United States aggression toward foreign nations became the participants. Using the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall & Jaggers, 2005) every nation state with a population 
greater than 500,000 was included in the study.  
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   Measuring Democracy 
 The Polity IV dataset, developed by Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1989) contains 
information concerning the governing system of the different nations from 1800 
through 2006. Each year represents a different data point; in this way a nation such as 
the United States has 206 separate data points representing its governance. Data 
points from 1950 to 2000 were used because following World War II the world saw a 
flourishing of democratic states and this allowed for a large enough sample from 
which to make comparisons. The data set gave scores for each nations level of 
democracy and autocracy, which are on a 0-10 scale. Each nations autocracy score is 
then subtracted from its democracy score to give the nations true democracy score 
which could range from -10 to 10, with +10 being the highest level of democracy.  
   Measuring Overt Military Operations 
 A second dataset, the Correlates of War Project (Ghoson & Palmer, 2003) was 
used to examine all of the countries which have been involved in overt Militarized 
Interstate Disputes with the United States for the same time period above 1950-2000. 
The dataset listed all of the countries taking part in the dispute and the hostility level 
reached in this dispute. Hostility level ranged from 1, no militarized dispute, to 5, 
open war. Only disputes rated 2 (threat of force) and higher were included in the 
analysis; this is a conservative estimate that errs on the side of the null hypothesis 
because it includes minor acts of aggression that the general public are less likely to 
pay attention to. The low level acts of aggression were included, however, as a match 
the covert actions which often fall far short of full-scale war. These two dataset 
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allowed a comparison of the rates at which the United States engages in overt 
militarized disputes with non-democracies versus other democracies.  
   Measuring Covert Military Operations 
 In the final comparison we sought to make was between the frequencies that 
the United States uses covert interventions in non-democracies versus other 
democracies. No reliable dataset was found that listed covert interventions taken by 
the United States against foreign nations, so the researchers set about to create a list 
of such occasions. To generate such a list archival research was conducted through 
the use of history books concerning the CIA and United States interventions. Most 
research materials were obtained through the University of Kansas Library and a 
listed is provided in the appendix. To be considered a reliable intervention each action 
was to be considered a true intervention by at least three separate sources and needed 
to achieve a level of action higher than simple threats of forces; the action needed to 
be in fact some form of action to be considered. To be considered covert these actions 
were compared against the MIDs from the Correlates of War Project to be sure of no 
overlap.  
In addition, these covert actions were independently examined in 
contemporaneous news articles by a pair of research assistants. These research 
assistants looked at news articles relating to such actions anywhere from the time the 
supposed action took place up to a year after such action in New York Times and 
Washington Post (two of the main newspapers of note in the United States). The 
research assistant then rated the level of covertness of each action based on whether 
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the action was mentioned at all in the newspapers and if so was mentioned as a 
United States action and did the government take responsibility for said action. 
Actions in which the United States claimed responsibility for at the time of the action 
were excluded. This left 29 cases of covert intervention in which the United States 
was engaged. Again, the rate at which the United States used covert intervention 
against non-democracies was compared to the rate it used such interventions against 
democracies and these two scores were then compared to the rates of overt militarized 
disputes against non-democracies and democracies. 
Results 
 To control for the fact that some countries had multiple observations a dummy 
variable was created for each country and removed the direct effect of its direct 
effect. The model was statistically significant F(1,202)=32.67, p<.001 η=.26 even 
when controlling for the effect of country F(1,48)=5.41, p<.001. The United States 
used covert force at a greater rate against democracies than against non-democracies 
and used overt force at a greater rate against non-democracies than democracies χ2 
(1df) =24.56, p<.000001 (see Table 2). When aggressing against democracies the 
United States used covert action 33% of time, while it used covert action just 5% of 
the time it aggressed against non-democracies. Alternatively, the United States used 
overt actions 95% of the time when aggressing against non-democracies compared to 
just 67% of the time we aggressed against democracies. 
 Another way of looking at the results is by comparing the mean amount of 
democracy targets of aggression had in covert versus overt operations. The target 
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nations of overt aggression had a mean level of democracy of -6.08, while the mean 
level of democracy for targets of covert aggression was -.05 (see Figure 4).  
 Both of these results provide strong evidence for our claim that public 
perceptions motivate the foreign policy decision making of leaders in a democracy. 
Leaders of democracies covertly aggress against other democracies at a greater rate 
than non-democracies; the desire to have their actions viewed as legitimate motivates 
the government to hide actions that the public would find inconsistent or out of 
balance with their perceptions of foreign countries. The government only needs to 
hide the actions from its own citizenry as this is the group that supplies the 
governments legitimacy. A covert action allows the government to aggress against 
other democracies while their citizens are unaware and thus allows such actions to 
take place without negatively affecting its perceived legitimacy.  
Study 4: Democracy and Detention in the War on Terror  
 Is there a difference in the allocation of detainees in the war on terror? The 
United States government has used two options (of course, they had more, but they 
tended to pursue only these two) to deal with high value prisoners from the war on 
terror, they could either be sent to the United States detention center at Guantanamo 
Bay or they can be subjected to extraordinary rendition, a process where they are 
turned over to a foreign nation to be interrogated.  
 I suggest that the public would not support sending detainees from 
democracies to Guantanamo Bay for enhanced interrogation. For these detainees 
the United States government will be motivated to hide their interrogation and 
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detention by having them extraordinarily rendered. Our hypotheses in this study are: 
Suspects, who are citizens of a democracy, a more likely to be subjected to 
extraordinary rendition than sent to Guantanamo Bay, and suspects from non-
democracies will not see this increased likelihood of extraordinary rendition. 
Method 
Participants: Participants in this study were in a very real sense unwilling 
participants-detainees picked up by the United States in its war on terror. The 
detainees consisted of two separate groups for comparison and were obtained through 
two separated sources.  
 The first group of detainees was those being held at the United States 
detention camp at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on the island of Cuba. 
Information concerning these detainees was obtained through a United States 
Department of Defense document procured off of their website (U.S. D.O.D., 2006). 
This list provided the names of 759 individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay and also 
provided the detainees country of citizenship.  
 The second group of detainees being examined was those which the United 
States government had decided to detain through the process of extraordinary 
rendition. Because extraordinary rendition is a covert operation, the U.S. Government 
does not provide online lists of those rendered, Instead, a list of these detainees was 
obtained through an online article published by Mother Jones (Mother Jones, 2008) 
which was extensively researched through sources such as Amnesty International, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, and Human Rights Watch. This list named 53 
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individuals who had been extraordinarily rendered from 2001-2006 the same time 
span as those held at Guantanamo. The list also provided the detainees country of 
citizenship, where they were rendered from and to, and the dates of the rendition. The 
key variable in both lists for the purpose of this study was the detainees nation of 
citizenship.  
 Again, as in Study 3, I sought to compare the rates at which detainees from 
non-democracies versus democracy were either sent to Guantanamo or 
extraordinarily rendered. To determine the level of democracy in the detainees 
countries of citizenship ship we again used the Polity IV dataset and determined a 
true democracy score for that country as we did in Study 3. Countries with 
democracy scores above 0 were treated as democracies and all others were treated as 
non-democracies.  
Results and Discussion 
  Detainees from democracies made up just 10% of those in Guantanamo Bay 
but made up 35% of the detainee population that was extraordinarily rendered t 
(250)=5.96, p<.001, η=.35 (see Figure 5). Another possible explanation of these 
findings could be that the data we obtained was possibly biased in favor of under 
reporting the number of individuals from non-democracies who were extraordinarily 
rendered. To address this possibility we ran a pseudo file draw test to see how many 
detainees from non-democracies would have had to gone unreported in our data set 
for our findings not to have achieved statistical significance at p=.05. Adding in 
fabricated detainees from non-democracies to our data it was determined that an 
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additional 62 detainees would be necessary for the results not to achieve significance. 
This would nearly triple the amount of individuals from non-democracies that were 
included in the original analysis suggesting that a biased sample is not driving our 
findings. Also, it is unlikely that 100% of the detainees our data set might miss would 
be from non-democracies adding to the likelihood that our model is picking up a real 
phenomenon. 
 These results provide yet another example of governments motivation to act 
in accordance with public perceptions. The United States government was motivated 
to hide its detainees from democracy by subjecting them to extraordinary rendition 
rather than processing them in its own detention center where they are more visible to 
the public and subject to our legal system. The public would see the enhanced 
interrogation of detainees from democracies as illegitimate and not support the 
techniques use, therefore the government attempted to hide such actions. Enhanced 
interrogation of detainees from non-democracies carried with it no such detriment to 
perceived legitimacy and could therefore be carried out in our own detention center.  
Discussion  
 The four studies presented here provide strong evidence that balance is at 
work in the publics perception of foreign policy and that this perception drives 
government action. Studies 1, 2A, and 2B all supported our hypothesis that the public 
is motivated by a need for balance when it constructs it perceptions of foreign nations 
and that this balancing is a bidirectional processes. In the first study a positive 
relationship between perceptions of foreign countrys level of democracy and their 
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level of alliance were found suggesting that they were motivated to have a consistent 
positive view of countries they perceived as tied to the United States. In this way they 
bestowed democracy on the United States allies and alliance on democracies. Our 
second study looked to manipulate both perceived democracy and level of alliance to 
show bidirectional causality. The findings supported our hypothesis; when 
participants were lead to believe Iran was a democracy they saw as more of a United 
States ally, and when we lead them to believe that a strong alliance existed between 
the two countries they perceived Iran as having an increase level of democracy.  
Studies 3 and 4 both provided evidence that the government may be taking 
public perception into account when crafting its foreign policy action. Study 3 three 
showed that the United States government used covert military actions at a greater 
rate against democracies than non-democracies. Study 4 showed that detainees from 
democracies were more likely to be extraordinarily rendered and sent to secret prisons 
than were citizens of non-democracies. Both these studies point to the fact that the 
government appears to be hiding negative treatment of other democracies and their 
citizens. This hiding appears to be motivated by a desire to appease public perception 
which would find such acts illegitimate.  
Although the evidence provided here appears to back up the contention that 
public perception is driving government action, it could be that this is not the process 
taking place. It is possible that government action is actually driving the publics 
perception and thus not taking the publics a priori perception into account before it 
acts. The observation that the government appears to be hiding some of its actions 
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through covert aggression and secret detention, however, would seem to support the 
idea that the government is motivated by the public and the desire to maintain its 
legitimacy in the public eye. This leads it to act toward foreign nations in ways that 
the public will view as in balance with their perceptions, and when these actions will 
be perceived as out of balance the government is motivated to hide its actions. 
Balance leads the American public to perceive other democracies as our allies. 
Balance is bidirectional which also means that when the public comes to view a 
country as our ally through either the media or another source they will also come to 
perceive that country as a democracy. This step provides an instance where the 
government may have the opportunity to shape public perception and thus increase 
the likelihood that the public will support it foreign policy. Our studies do not directly 
speak to what the original source of the publics perception is, but they do illustrate 
the importance of those perceptions. 
Another problem that was encountered in the analysis had to do with the using 
democracy as our dependent measure. While I am confident in the measure of 
democracy used from the Polity IV dataset, exactly what each score on the democracy 
scale means maybe up for interpretation. Countries scoring on the extreme ends of the 
scale certainly seem to representative of our measure; that is countries scoring 7-10 
on the scale appear to be good examples of democracies and countries scoring on the 
extreme low end are representative of autocratic regimes. It is the middle of the scale 
that may provide some problems in the analysis. I am not exactly sure, for example, 
what it means to score 2 on the democracy scale. These countries do display some 
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democratic traits but may not be the types of countries the public would think of as a 
true democracy. A more accurate analysis may leave out these middle ground 
democracy scores and instead focus on more reliable democracies and autocracies. 
This problem, if anything may muddle the obtained results because the countries 
scoring in the middle range of the democracy scale are likely not the ones that the 
public perceives as democracies. The fact that even with them included in the analysis 
the results were significant may point to the robustness of the findings.  
The importance of the finding that the public uses balance to form perceptions 
of foreign countries comes from the fact that the government appears to be using this 
public perception to guide its foreign policy and actions. Whether the government 
creates these public perceptions is beyond the scope of the studies reported there. 
What the studies show us is that the government is motivated to take account of 
public opinion so that it can maintain its legitimacy. If the public comes to view their 
government and its actions as inconsistent or not in a balanced state they will come to 
find those actions or even the government as illegitimate.  
Legitimacy is important to authorities because it allows them the ability to act 
and have their actions supported more easily than if it is absent. A government that 
lacks legitimacy must then rely on force to get its citizens to comply with its actions 
and policies. For these reasons it is desirable for governments to try and maintain 
their legitimacy by acting consistently with public perception and when their actions 
are out of step with the publics opinion it will attempt to hide those actions so their 
legitimacy is not questioned. Legitimacy not only allows a government to act and 
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have its actions supported, but also constrains the ways governments are able to act. 
When pursuing foreign policy goals a government must keep in mind that only 
certain actions will be viewed as legitimate in the public eye and actions that are out 
side this scope will challenge the publics belief in the legitimacy of the government.  
 In studies 3 and 4, the Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy is used to account for 
the real world phenomenon of democratic peace and the governments allocation of 
detainees where the government appears to be stepping beyond the behaviors that the 
public would consider legitimate. In both studies the government hid actions taken 
against other democracies and their citizens, by acting covertly or by hiding our 
actions behind another country. Our model is able to account for this government 
action where as other explanations for democratic peace can not and as Buchannan 
and Tullock (1962) have stated, the only final test of a model lies in its ability to 
assist in understanding real phenomenon (pp. 21).  
All of the findings point to the fact that consistency plays an important role in 
public perception and that public perception is playing a role in shaping government 
action. Balance, as we have discussed, is bidirectional and these studies cannot 
address is where the public perception is developing. It could actually be the case the 
government is driving public perception by cultivating beliefs about foreign countries 
levels of democracy or alliance with our own country; it could also be the media 
influencing public perception. What our findings do tell us is that the public 
perception, no matter what source it arises from, is motivating government decision 
making.
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1 The United States was left out of the survey as some of the questions were about the target nations 
relations with the U.S. The other nation to be excluded was the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
because one of the questions asked for participants perceptions of the target nations level of 
democracy and any undue influence stemming from a nations name wanted to be avoided. 
 
38 
References 
Buchannan, J., M., & Tullock, G. (1962) The calculus of consent: Logical 
foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press 
Buchanan, A. (2002). Political legitimacy and democracy. Ethics, 112, 689-719. 
Disappearing act: Rendition by the numbers. (2008, March 3). Mother Jones. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2008/03/disappearing-act.html 
Crandall, C. S., & Beasley, R. K. (2001). A perceptual theory of legitimacy: Politics,  
 prejudice, social institutions, and moral value. In J. Jost and B. Major (Eds.). 
The psychology of legitimacy (pp. 121-145). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ghoson, F., & Palmer, G. (2003). Correlates of war 2 project: Codebook for the  
 militarized interstate dispute data, version 3.0. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University. 
Gurr, T. R., Jaggers, K., & Moore, W. H. (1989). Polity II. Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR. 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley 
Hermann, M. G., & Kegley, C.W., Jr. (1995). Rethinking democracy and 
international peace: Perspectives from political psychology. International 
Studies Quarterly, 39, 511-533. 
Kegley, C.W., Jr., & Hermann, M. G. (1995). The political psychology of peace 
through democratization. Cooperation and Conflict, 30, 5-30. 
  
39
 
Lipset, S., M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development 
and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53, 69-105. 
Levy, J. S., (1988). Domestic politics and war. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
18: 653-673. 
Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (2005). Polity IV project: Dataset users manual.  
 Arlington, VA: Center for Global Polity George Mason University. 
Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and structural causes of democratic peace,  
 1946-1986. American Political Science Review, 87, 624-638. 
Saddam 'wins 100% of vote.' (2002, October 16). BBC News. Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2331951.stm 
U.S. Department of Defense. (2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department 
of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba From January 2002 through May 15, 
2006. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detaineesFOIArelease15May2006.pdf 
Weart, S. R., (1998). Never at War, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Zelditch, M. (2001). Processes of legitimation: Recent developments and new 
 directions. Social Psychology Quarterly. 64, 4-17. 
Zelditch, M., & Walker, H. A. (2003). The legitimacy of regimes. Advances in Group  
 Processes. 20, 217-249.  
40 
Table 1: UN Correlations study 1 
       Democracy   Ally            Similar    
 
Ally  .23**    
 
Similar .22*    .63**   
 
Important       -.007               .24*    .69** 
* p<.001, **p<.0001 
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Table 2: Overt vs. covert actions against non-democracies and democracies 
 
   N  Overt  Covert      Odds Ratio  
         (Overt:Covert) 
 
Non-Democracy 209  209  12   17.4 
 Percentage   94.6%  5.4% 
 
Democracy  31  21  10   2.1 
 Percentage   67.7%  32.3% 
χ2 (1df) =24.56, p<.000001 
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Table 3: Number of detainees held by level of democracy in nation of origin study 4 
 
             Odds Ratio  
   N     Guantanamo        Rendition (Gitmo:Rendition) 
 
Non-Democracy 716  681  35   19.5 
 Percentage   95.1%  4.9% 
 
Democracy  91  73  18   4.06 
 Percentage   80.2%  19.8% 
χ2 (1df) =29.18, p<.00001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
43
 
 
 
Figure 1: Plot of participant perceptions study 1 
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Figure 2: Perceptions of alliance with U.S. by democracy status study2B 
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Figure 3: Perceptions of democracy by ally status study 2B 
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Figure 4: Mean level of democracy by type of intervention study 3 
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Appendix A: 
Study 1 sample questionnaire 
 
I am a U.S. citizen (circle one):   Yes / No  
Haiti (24 October 1945)  
Location: Caribbean   Capital: Port-Au-Prince   Population: 8,308,504   Language: French 
GDP per capita: $1,800   Export commodities: manufactures, coffee, oils, cocoa, mangoes 
How important is this country on the world stage? 
        Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Extremely important 
How similar is this country to the United States? 
        Not at all similar    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very similar 
How democratic is this countrys government (circle one)? 
        A complete democracy     A partial democracy     A very limited democracy     No democracy at all 
What level of relation does this country hold with the United States? 
        Enemy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Ally 
Afghanistan (19 November 1946)  
Location: Southern Asia   Capital: Kabul   Population: 31,056,997   Language: Farsi   GDP per capita: $800   
Export commodities: opium, fruits and nuts, handwoven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and pelts, precious 
and semi-precious gems 
How important is this country on the world stage? 
        Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Extremely important 
How similar is this country to the United States? 
        Not at all similar    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very similar 
How democratic is this countrys government (circle one)? 
        A complete democracy     A partial democracy     A very limited democracy     No democracy at all 
What level of relation does this country hold with the United States? 
        Enemy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Ally 
Slovenia (22 May 1992) 
Location: Central Europe   Capital: Ljubljana   Population: 2,010,347   Language: Slovenian 
GDP per capita: $22,900   Export commodities: manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment,  
chemicals, food 
How important is this country on the world stage? 
        Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Extremely important 
How similar is this country to the United States? 
        Not at all similar    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very similar 
How democratic is this countrys government (circle one)? 
        A complete democracy     A partial democracy     A very limited democracy     No democracy at all 
What level of relation does this country hold with the United States? 
        Enemy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Ally 
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Qatar (21 September 1971) 
Location: Middle East   Capital: Doha   Population: 885,359   Language: Arabic 
GDP per capita: $29,400   Export commodities: liquefied natural gas (LNG), petroleum products, fertilizers,  
Steel 
How important is this country on the world stage? 
        Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Extremely important 
How similar is this country to the United States? 
        Not at all similar    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very similar 
How democratic is this countrys government (circle one)? 
        A complete democracy     A partial democracy     A very limited democracy     No democracy at all 
What level of relation does this country hold with the United States? 
        Enemy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Ally 
Poland (24 October 1945)  
Location: Central Europe   Capital: Warsaw   Population: 38,536,869   Language: Polish 
GDP per capita: $14,100   Export commodities: machinery and transport equipment, intermediate  
manufactured goods, miscellaneous manufactured goods, food and live animals 
How important is this country on the world stage? 
        Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Extremely important 
How similar is this country to the United States? 
        Not at all similar    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very similar 
How democratic is this countrys government (circle one)? 
        A complete democracy     A partial democracy     A very limited democracy     No democracy at all 
What level of relation does this country hold with the United States? 
        Enemy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Ally 
Togo (20 September 1960)  
Location: Western Africa   Capital: Lome   Population: 5,548,702   Language: French 
GDP per capita: $1,700   Export commodities: reexports, cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa  
How important is this country on the world stage? 
        Not at all important    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Extremely important 
How similar is this country to the United States? 
        Not at all similar    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very similar 
How democratic is this countrys government (circle one)? 
        A complete democracy     A partial democracy     A very limited democracy     No democracy at all 
What level of relation does this country hold with the United States? 
        Enemy    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Ally 
 
The United States of America is the greatest nation in the world 
Very strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strongly agree 
How democratic is the United States government (circle one)? 
A complete democracy     A partial democracy     A very limited democracy     No democracy at all 
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Appendix B: 
Study 2A sample vignette 
 
History of Iran 
 
 The history of country of Iran encompasses more than six thousand years, and 
is included among the few nations that make up the cradle of humanity. Irans history, 
like most nations, is varied and has seen different periods of prosper and decline. 
During one of the countrys cultural peaks under the rule of Cyrus the Great (590-530 
BCE), Iran is credited with the first declaration of human rights, the Cyrus Cylinder. 
Iran has also seen its power challenged and has been conquered several times, 
including the Turkish invasion of the 11th century and Mongol invasion led by 
Genghis Khan in the 13th century. However, throughout its history Iran has remained 
an important country both economically and culturally.  
In the 20th the history of Iran began to converge with that of the United States 
as the U.S. began to become the main player on the world stage. One of the factors 
facilitating new contact between the two countries was the emergence of crude oil as 
the most important energy producing resource, a resource abundant in the region Iran 
occupies. Beginning in the early 1970s the United States began to see a significant 
growth in its ties with the country of Iran. Government relations improved 
dramatically over the decade. Many state officials exchanged trips between the two 
countries and diplomatic communications increased dramatically leading to the 
brokering of substantial treaties between the countries. The U.S. President even flew 
into Iran to meet with countrys leaders. In addition to the increase in cooperation 
between state departments, the 70s also saw an influx of student exchange programs 
between the U.S. and Iran. Both students and tourists began to travel more freely 
between the two countries also helping to develop closer ties between the two 
countries and establishing Iran as a key U.S. ally in the region.  
While the 1970s saw a highpoint in U.S.-Iran relations, the 1980s witnessed 
a rapid downturn in this relationship. In 1979, violent demonstrations within the 
country were initiated by factions outside the government; eventually these uprisings 
led to the ouster of the Iranian government and the takeover over a new governing 
body. Afterward, government relations between the U.S. and Iran deteriorated 
dramatically over the next decade. Communication between the two countries all but 
ceased as each country withdrew their diplomats. Travel restrictions were imposed 
and students and tourists were forced to return home further straining the already 
tenuous ties between the countries. By the end of the 1980's, the relationship would 
best be characterized as adversarial and indeed the countries butted-heads numerous 
times on the floor of the United Nations. 
A lot of time has elapsed since the 1980s and the current relations between 
the U.S. and Iran are a product of the many changes that have taken place during that 
time. Different leaders are now in charge of both countries and ties between the two 
will greatly depend on these new leaders and their policy decisions. 
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Appendix C: 
Study 2B sample vignette 
 
History of Iran 
  
The history of country of Iran encompasses over six thousand years, and is 
included amongst the few nations that make up the cradle of humanity. Irans history, 
like most nations, is varied and has seen different periods of prosper and decline. 
During one of the countrys cultural peaks under the rule of Cyrus the Great (590-530 
BCE), Iran is credited with the first declaration of human rights, the Cyrus Cylinder. 
Iran has also seen its power challenged and has been conquered several times, 
including the Turkish invasion of the 11th century and Mongol invasion led by 
Genghis Khan in the 13th century. However, throughout its history Iran has remained 
an important country both economically and culturally.  
The political history of Iran has seen many different periods of change, and 
the 20th century was no exception. One example of political change was in1970, when 
the people of Iran enjoyed a flourishing of new democracy. Nearly all important 
government officials were elected to their posts and regular elections were held, 
usually with high voter turn-out. Voting rights were extended to an ever-growing 
proportion of the population and the country was generally considered a model 
democracy by other countries within the United Nations.  
All this democracy came to an end, however, late in 1979. Throughout the end 
of 1979 and into 1980s, violent uprisings began to spring up in Iran and increased in 
frequency until the democratically-elected government was eventually ousted. Taking 
the place of the old government was an unelected mullah who abolished elections and 
declared himself supreme ruler of the Iranian people. During the 1980s the mullah 
kept himself in power through his tight control of the military, which he used to keep 
any opposition to his leadership in check. The secret intelligence service inspired fear 
amongst the countrys population, and the leader had almost unchecked power within 
the country for the entire decade of the 1980s. 
A lot of time has elapsed since the end of the 1980s and the mullah system of 
Iran; this particular leader died, and the system he developed has been out of power 
for decades now. The country of Iran is currently going through many political 
changes and the government no longer resembles this period. Iran, however, 
continues to be an important player of on the world stage.
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Appendix D: Study 2A sample questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1970s, when the USA and 
Iran were allies. 
 
1. How democratic is the Iranian government (circle one)? 
A complete democracy A partial democracy A very limited 
democracy 
No democracy at all 
2. How similar is the Iranian government to the US Government? 
Very different from the US government     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very similar to 
the US government 
 
3. How well does the head of the Iranian government represent the majority of the Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
4. How responsive is the head of the Iranian government to the will and goals of Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
5. From what I can tell, the Iranian people seem moral, good, and trustworthy. 
Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy      1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very good, 
moral, and trustworthy 
 
6. How corrupt do you think the government of Iran is? 
Not at all corrupt   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Extremely corrupt 
 
7. Does Iran sound like a place that you might like to live? 
Very undesirable place     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very desirable place 
 
 
Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1980s, when the alliance 
between the country had ended. 
 
1. How democratic is the Iranian government (circle one)? 
A complete democracy A partial democracy A very limited 
democracy 
No democracy at all 
2. How similar is the Iranian government to the US Government? 
Very different from the US government     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very similar to 
the US government 
 
3. How well does the head of the Iranian government represent the majority of the Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
4. How responsive is the head of the Iranian government to the will and goals of Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
5. From what I can tell, the Iranian people seem moral, good, and trustworthy. 
Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy      1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very good, 
moral, and trustworthy 
 
6. How corrupt do you think the government of Iran is? 
Not at all corrupt   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Extremely corrupt 
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7. Does Iran sound like a place that you might like to live? 
Very undesirable place     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very desirable place 
 
Appendix D: Study 2A sample questionnaire continued 
 
Please answer the following questions about the United States 
 
1. The United States of America is the greatest nation in the world 
Very strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strongly agree 
 
2. The United States of America is a trustworthy and honorable country 
Very strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strongly agree 
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Appendix E: Study 2B sample questionnaire 
 
Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1970s, when Iran had a 
democratic government. 
 
1. How much of an ally was Iran to the United States (circle one)? 
A major ally A partial ally A very limited ally Not an ally at all 
2. How similar is the Iranian government to the US Government? 
Very different from the US government     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very similar to 
the US government 
 
3. How well does the head of the Iranian government represent the majority of the Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
4. How responsive is the head of the Iranian government to the will and goals of Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
5. From what I can tell, the Iranian people seem moral, good, and trustworthy. 
Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy      1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very good, 
moral, and trustworthy 
 
6. How corrupt do you think the government of Iran is? 
Not at all corrupt   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Extremely corrupt 
 
7. Does Iran sound like a place that you might like to live? 
Very undesirable place     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very desirable place 
 
Please answer the following questions about Iran during the 1980s, when the country was 
presided over by an unelected mullah. 
 
1. How much of an ally was Iran to the United States (circle one)? 
A major ally A partial ally A very limited ally Not an ally at all 
 
2. How similar is the Iranian government to the US Government? 
Very different from the US government     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very similar to 
the US government 
 
3. How well does the head of the Iranian government represent the majority of the Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
4. How responsive is the head of the Iranian government to the will and goals of Iranian people? 
Very poorly     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very well 
 
5. From what I can tell, the Iranian people seem moral, good, and trustworthy. 
Not at all good, moral, or trustworthy      1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very good, 
moral, and trustworthy 
 
6. How corrupt do you think the government of Iran is? 
Not at all corrupt   1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Extremely corrupt 
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7. Does Iran sound like a place that you might like to live? 
Very undesirable place     1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9     Very desirable place 
 
Appendix E: Study 2B sample questionnaire continued 
 
Please answer the following questions about the United States 
 
1. The United States of America is the greatest nation in the world 
Very strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strongly agree 
 
2. The United States of America is a trustworthy and honorable country 
Very strongly disagree    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    Very strongly agree 
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Study 3 covert action sources 
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